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Abstract 
In a context in which multinational companies are increasingly able to choose their locations 
of production, this paper examines how social and political governance actors in host regional 
economies attempt to attract and retain foreign direct investment. Based on a comparative 
study of two regions in each of Canada, Ireland, Spain and the UK, it shows both national and 
in some cases sub-national variations in the nature of attempts to attract and retain foreign 
investment, as well as in the actors involved. The paper also discusses how these differences 
in policy interact with the characteristics of specific foreign investors. Our findings support 
arguments that attempts to embed regime-shopping firms are facilitated by active governance 
from social as well as state actors. 
Introduction 
This paper focuses on the ways in which social and political actors in local and regional 
economies attempt to organise themselves in order to make their geographical territories 
attractive destinations for foreign direct investment (FDI). This includes both the general 
effects of corporate international mobility on regions’ attempts to be ‘competitive’, and 
specific interactions between regional actors and particular inward investors. It seeks to 
highlight the conditions under which the activities of foreign direct investors become 
embedded in local and regional economies, and with what consequences on local social and 
political actors. Our analysis is informed by a comparative research project examining such 
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relationships in two regions in each of four advanced industrial economies (Canada, Ireland, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom). 
We start by briefly presenting a perspective on host economies in the context of mobile FDI, 
before highlighting the local dimensions of this. We then give details of the comparative 
research project, before presenting summary findings. We do this first by summarising the 
approachess followed within the regional/national systems we encountered, and then by 
examining the different factors which combine to create different degrees of co-dependence 
between foreign direct investors and their host regions. Finally, the conclusions try to draw 
out practical implications for policy-makers and social actors. 
“Host effects” and regime shopping 
The literature on industrial relations and labour management in multinational corporations 
(MNCs) frequently discusses ‘host country effects’ (e.g. Ferner et al 2001; Bae et al 1998; 
Edwards and Zhang 2008). This type of research deals with two slightly different concepts, 
albeit often within the same research projects. 
Firstly, studies have examined the existence of legal/collective regulation which might be 
seen as ‘constraints’ on foreign multinationals acting within the host nation(s) under 
investigation (e.g. Muller 1998; Schmitt and Sadowski 2003). These might impede or prevent 
the transfer into particular host countries of country-of-origin, or global ‘best practice’ 
inspired labour management policies. This literature looks at whether and how MNCs, or 
particular types or nationalities of MNCs, conform with, seek to avoid, or seek somehow to 
negotiate, the nature of host country constraints.  Equally, it analyses the pressures foreign 
multinationals place on historically-established national systems of industrial relations and 
labour market regulation. 
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Second, some researchers examine how MNCs may attempt to use institutionally embedded 
resources. These may include potential advantages derived from skills institutions, research 
and development infrastructures, or the presence of clusters of competent firms which may 
engage as suppliers (e.g. Kristensen and Morgan 2007; Lam 2003; Saka-Helmout and 
Geppert, 2011). Such resources have for some time been seen in this literature as the domain 
in which older, higher cost industrialised economies compete for FDI, through what is 
sometimes termed institutionally-derived ‘societal comparative advantage’ (Sorge 1991). 
Trying to make any realistic assessment of host constraints and resources requires an 
understanding of the contemporary context of international business. Clearly, as other papers 
in this issue reflect, neo-liberal globalisation has strengthened the hand of MNCs in relation 
to host business and employment systems. There are of course many factors at play here, but 
it is worth briefly highlighting the following: 
i) the additional locational flexibility of FDI brought into play by single market legislation, as 
well as broader international trade agreements; 
ii) in Europe in particular, the possibilities for ‘brownfield’ investment which emerged in 
processes of privatisation (see for example the internationalisation of ownership of the 
European steel sector); 
iii) the multiple ways in which technology, often allied to product market liberalisation, has 
enabled markets to be serviced remotely (in Anglophone countries at least, the Indian call 
centre has been one of the core public images of economic globalisation); 
iv) the multiple ways in which corporate financialisation, and the related ideology of the lean 
enterprise, have made MNCs increasingly unwilling/unable to tolerate redundancy of 
capacity, leading in many cases to intense competition between different geographical sites of 
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the same MNC for investment (the auto industry is the emblematic case in point here, see 
Delteil and Dieuaide 2012); 
v) the broad transition at state level from protecting national productive capitalisms to 
securing positions in international contests for mobile investment. 
All these interrelated factors both enable and encourage increasing proportions of productive 
capital to engage in ‘regime shopping’ between the institutionally-derived constraints and 
resources of different places. 
Regime shopping and its local dimensions 
Regime shopping was a phrase popularised in the industrial relations literature by Wolfgang 
Streeck (Streeck 1991; see also Traxler and Woitech 2000; Mueller 1996). It has been used 
mainly to draw attention to the ways in which some MNCs have sought to avoid labour-
friendly elements of host country regulation, the consequent risks of social dumping if 
investment decisions are made on this basis, and thus the risks of a race to the bottom as 
erstwhile social democracies compete for productive investment with regimes that offer 
fewer protections for labour. All of this is still relevant. But regime shopping is now more 
endemic, and goes beyond host country industrial relations (although beyond our scope here, 
recent controversies around the dubious tax strategies of many MNCs reinforce this point).  
To extend the ‘shopping’ analogy, those firms whose investment is mobile are quasi-
customers of the business and employment systems of different geographies, balancing host 
resources and constraints within a context in which geographies are constrained to conceive 
of each other as rivals for investment. Within this, not all MNCs shop in the same way. 
Broadly speaking, there is a continuum between, on the one hand, firms that attempt to select 
the most appropriate locations a la carte and then attempt to act pretty much in isolation from 
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institutional actors in the host economy, and, on the other, firms where subsidiary managers 
choose to engage with host institutional actors in order to construct a more desirable 
environment for themselves through continuing relationships. 
Another important part of our argument is the need to fully integrate the fact that regime 
shopping is not purely about competition for productive investment between nation states. It 
is also, and often primarily, between specific places or regions (e.g. Rutherford and Holmes, 
2008; Phelps and Fuller 2001). 
One dimension of this occurs where there is formal sub-national variation in the nature of 
labour market regulation. The best known case of this is the contrast in the USA between the, 
largely Northern, states that continue to recognise the core features the New Deal industrial 
relations system, and those states, initially in the South, that pursue anti-union “right to work” 
legislation. Indeed, the American industrial relations literature has dealt prominently with the 
role of threats to relocate in both organising campaigns and collective bargaining rounds 
(Logan 2002, Godard 2004).  In most other advanced economies, variation is less formal, but 
still has been argued to have effects on investment decisions.  For example, the fact that 
1980s inward investors in UK manufacturing who sought union avoidance or Japanese-type 
collective relations typically located in areas remote from the traditional sectoral or 
occupational strongholds of British industrial relations (Hudson 1994), can fairly easily be 
interpreted as a sub-national variant of a Streeck-type vision of regime shopping. 
Outside this dimension of ‘union avoidance by location’ however, we need also to consider 
the fact that most MNCs (with obvious exceptions in customer-facing services) are heavily 
geographically concentrated in one or more local sites within nations. From a managerial 
point of view, their concerns in the area of labour market resources/constraints are therefore 
logically mainly local. That is, they are concerned with the specific human resources 
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available in the local/regional labour market (or from people that can be attracted to the 
region), as well as the local conditions under which the human resource is exploited (for a 
more detailed discussion, see Almond 2011). 
Equally, the impacts of specific MNCs – on patterns of employment relations, on other 
businesses and on employment levels – are most keenly felt at local and regional levels. A 
major industrial plant closure may be bad news for the national economy, but it can be near-
catastrophic for local economies. Because of this, local actors, whether trade unionists, or 
local/regional politicians and civil servants, are to a fairly large extent constrained to be 
inducted into the local subsidiary unit’s efforts to compete. This gives significant foreign 
investors whose investment is at least somewhat mobile significant power to negotiate the 
nature of labour market governance as it applies to them at these more local levels (Elger and 
Smith 2005). Equally, the various direct and indirect subsidies/financial supports available to 
new and existing investors are often awarded by decision-makers at regional levels, while the 
inward investment orientation of regional economic development agencies further reinforces 
‘tailoring’ local systems to the needs or desires of inward investors.  
Finally, MNC subsidiaries vary in the extent to which managers have the capacity and 
competence to pursue autonomous strategies (Morgan and Kristensen 2006, Bélanger et al 
2013). In many cases, the survival of individual subsidiary units depends on the ability of 
their managers to win international mandates – for a particular type of product, for research 
and development, for back office services etc. Where this is the case, subsidiary-level 
managers are likely to use whatever institutionalised resources are available that may give 
them some kind of advantage in competition with other subsidiary units. This may involve 
active engagement with a variety of local actors, rather than simply a passive use of existing 
localised comparative advantage. More optimistic accounts (e.g. Kristensen and Morgan 
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2012) stress ways in which local actors may, through experimenting with forms of 
governance, develop international competitiveness in this process. 
The sub-national governance, multinational corporations and human resources project 
To summarise the material above, our argument is that discussions on the relations between 
foreign multinationals and host economies are incomplete if they do not take account of the 
ways in which governance actors have mobilised in order to compete for new and repeat 
inward investment. Therefore, on top of the relatively well established literature on the 
relations between national industrial relations institutions and foreign multinationals, it is 
necessary to take account of a wider range of actors involved in the governance of the 
relevant local economy and labour market.  
Our comparative research. across two regions in each of Canada, Ireland, Spain and the UK, 
seeks to add to this developing literature. It has three broad research questions. Firstly, we 
seek to explore the extent to which there are place-specific (whether national or regional) 
differences in the strategies that governance actors have developed in mobilising around the 
attraction and retention of foreign direct investment. Second, and relatedly, we examine the 
extent of differences in the actors involved; for example, whether industrial relations actors 
are included or excluded in the local coalitions that try to attract and retain investment. 
Finally, we attempt to offer evidence on the extent to which regional and national governance 
relate with other, more firm-specific, factors, which would be expected to affect the local 
embeddedness of multinationals’ subsidiaries. Our eventual aim is to help build a more 
adequate picture of the relationship between multinationals and host business systems, and of 




Canada, Ireland, Spain and the UK were selected for their broadly comparable positions 
within the international competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). Each has become 
relatively highly dependent on FDI over the course of the last three decades, although clearly 
not to identical extents, as we reflect below. Equally, they were previously able to compete 
for FDI with their geographically closest trading partners – the USA, in the case of Canada, 
and the European Union (EU) in the other three national economies – at least partially on the 
basis of relatively low labour costs, light labour regulation and/or low corporate taxation. 
However, due to the various changes in the global political economy of FDI, each has come 
under pressure to offer more positive advantages, in the areas of infrastructure, innovation 
and skills ecosystems. 
Two regions were investigated in each country in order to permit intra-national comparisons. 
We attempted where possible to choose regions with different characteristics regarding 
economic governance, and, across the international comparison, degrees of regional identity 
and autonomy. The regions selected were Asturias and Madrid (Spain), regions of Ontario 
and Quebec (Canada), and the NorthWest and East Midlands (England – note the use of 
England rather than the UK is intentional here, as the institutions of the other countries of the 
UK are somewhat different). The two regions of Ireland are anonymised as the Sigma and 
Gamma regions. In practice, for our purposes in this paper, intra-national differences were 
not particularly significant in England or Ireland, and thus here we concentrate on the overall 
national picture. 
Initial interviews were held with key institutional actors within each region, predominantly 
inward investment/economic development agencies, as a pilot study had confirmed these as 
nodal actors in region-MNC relations. Following these interviews, actors were asked to 
identify other institutional actors within the region who engaged with FDI. These were added 
to a provisional list of forms of governance actor (regional state actors, employer 
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associations, trade unions, skills and education institutions, etc.) drawn up on the basis of 
prior related literature. This process aimed to ensure that all active regional institutional 
actors were identified. MNCs of interest were identified through initial interviews, and 
sometimes through secondary material (investment agency publications or websites, etc.). 
Prior to the data collection stage, a standardised semi-structured interview format was 
collectively designed by the international research team, pertaining to the interaction of 
institutional actors with FDI within the region. Two broad interview formats were devised to 
account for the different perspectives of governance actors and MNC unit directors/managers. 
The interview format also provided sufficient flexibility to explore unique region or nation-
specific issues which arose during the course of the interviews. Interviews were recorded for 
accuracy and transparency. A standardised coding structure for qualitative interviews was 
also verified by all research teams prior to data collection.  A total of 189 interviews have 
been held across the eight regions (51 in England, 57 in Ireland, 43 in Spain and 38 in 
Canada). While the substantial majority of these were with regional-level governance actors 
or with regionally established MNCs, some interviews were also held at more local levels, 
and at national level, where initial interviews had revealed such actors to be active agents. 
Features of the regional and national governance systems 
This section presents the core features of the governance systems we examined, as they affect 
the competition to attract and retain FDI. 
England 
The UK has long been the recipient of a large amount of FDI. While some of the factors 
shaping this are cultural/historic (e.g. English language, close relations to the USA) or 
structural (a relatively large domestic market), its FDI performance is also explained both by 
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financial globalisation, given London’s jealously-guarded status as a global financial centre, 
and by light regulation within a broadly liberal market economy. In the productive sector, the 
loss of the UK’s previous relatively low-cost status within the European market would seem, 
on the face of it, to drive a need for the creation of the ‘high road’ forms of institutional 
advantage. 
However, the empirical picture is very mixed. In terms of knowledge-driven activities, the 
UK benefits from what remains, in a European context, a successful, and relatively 
entrepreneurial, higher education sector, and there is clear evidence of innovation-based 
clustering in certain well-known areas, usually around elite universities. But in terms of the 
more general picture, and of the formal governance both of FDI, and of sub-national business 
systems, more generally, attempts at the creation of non-market coordination have proved 
highly unstable.  
England has a highly centralised system of political governance of the economy: there is no 
significant regional tier of political government. When the research for the current project 
began, this picture was partially mitigated by the existence of ten (non-elected) Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) in England, created by the New Labour government (1997-
2010. These were specifically created to coordinate responses to ‘market failures’ at a 
regional level.  
RDAs had a direct role in dealing with both the attraction of new inward investment, and in 
the retention and development of existing subsidiary units. In these functions, they worked 
alongside the national trade and investment agency UKTI. They had a particularly significant 
role as a ‘broker’ between MNC subsidiary units and the wider public sphere, particularly in 
their role as an intermediary between private firms and England’s complex network of skills 
institutions. Significantly, in an economy in which dialogue between employers on skills 
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needs has historically proved difficult to establish, they also served as interest aggregators in 
this area; our fieldwork shows several instances in which RDAs identified specific skills 
issues among neighbouring large firms, and played a role in the coordination of the skills 
provision required. Thus, although formal sub-national autonomy of the business system in 
England was limited, the presence of RDAs did provide MNC subsidiary units – particularly 
those which were regionally important employers – with a regional interlocutor with some 
decision-making powers over the distribution of public funding.  
More recently, the Conservative/Liberal coalition in the UK has abolished RDAs. Formal 
public responsibility for FDI attraction and retention has been passed mainly to national level, 
with local support operating on something of a patchwork basis depending on what local 
authorities are able and willing to finance. Some of the roles of RDAs will be advanced by 
more localised Local Enterprise Partnerships. While it is too early to judge the effectiveness 
of these, their very limited funding is likely to limit their coordinating ability. UK directors of 
a number of large foreign-owned MNCs have highlighted potential problems arising from 
centralised actors’ lack of knowledge of regional economic issues, and of the lack of a 
recognised regional interlocutor for discussing strategic issues (Almond et al 2012).  Local 
innovation, and MNC managers making active efforts to engage with local actors in the skills 
and education sectors, clearly does occur, but there are clear issues of resources, and of 
difficulties for private actors in understanding the dynamic complexity of the UK skills 
system without expert brokers. 
In summary, within a liberal market economy and centralised political system, RDAs can be 
seen as an experiment in sub-national coordination, while the emerging arrangements are an 
experiment in the powers of local, largely unfunded voluntarism. Trade unions are essentially 
excluded from formal governance in both cases. In general, with some exceptions, MNC 
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subsidiary managers in England make fewer active connections with their surrounding 
local/regional business systems than in the other two countries considered here. 
Spain 
Spain is a notably less liberal economy than the other nations under comparison here. It also 
has among the highest degrees of regional political decentralisation in Europe. Spain is 
divided into 17 Autonomous Communities with directly elected governments. These have 
extensive competencies in planning, transport, culture and sport, agriculture, health, 
education and social assistance, as well as economic development. References by our 
interviewees to “the government” frequently meant the regional rather than national 
government. While we have some evidence, particularly from the Madrid region, of large 
multinationals seeking political deals with national governmental actors, the broader picture 
is that public responsibility for the attraction and retention of FDI is held at regional 
(Autonomous Community) level, with the national state having relatively little direct 
involvement.  
The modern competition for FDI dates from Spain’s entry into the European Community in 
1986. Since then, there has been intense geographical competition for FDI. This competition 
has centred not only on new investment, but also, and in some peripheral industrial regions 
such as Asturias particularly, on maintaining employment within large privatised plants in the 
extensive formerly nationalised sector, which have been extensively rationalised as their 
ownership has largely passed into foreign hands.  Regions generally have inward investment 
agencies which, while under the control of regional governments, have substantial day to day 
autonomy (although, towards the end of our fieldwork, the right wing regional government of 
Madrid partially abolished its agency, in a move which has some parallels with Conservative 
policy in England). 
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Given the substantial autonomy of regional governments, regions have been able to seek FDI 
through intra-national variations in elements of the sub-national business systems facing 
potential investors, and to adopt different approaches to wider coordination – Madrid is the 
epitome of neo-liberalism in a Spanish context, while Asturias has, since the 1980s, largely 
followed a form of ‘business-friendly social democracy’, with employers’ associations and 
trade unions having an important and institutionalised role in governance of the regional 
political economy.  Asturias is unusual in that its economic development goals are ratified 
through a tripartite regional collective agreement, while Madrid minimises union 
involvement. 
In Asturias, strategic initiatives at the subsidiary level seemed to receive fairly effective 
support from governance actors, either through regional inward investment agencies, or more 
directly through relations with regional Ministries. At least some subsidiary-level actors had 
been successful in attracting global or European-level mandates, including significant 
research and development activity, sometimes based on engineering skills derived from the 
region’s heritage and from the various governance actors’ attempts to reinforce this. The 
existence of clear and relatively powerful regional-level interlocutors was generally 
acknowledged as important here. Additionally, in a comparative perspective, the existence of 
strong regional identities did seem to be an important factor in creating consensus and 
relatively strong ties between the actors involved. This was somewhat less the case in the 
Madrid region. The latter competes for headquarters functions as well as industrial FDI, and 
has much more fuzzy economic boundaries, perhaps making regional actions harder to 
coordinate. Equally, its free market ideology leads to a rhetoric of preventing ‘exit barriers’, 
meaning the emphasis on the protection of existing industrial MNC units is somewhat lesser. 
In general, though, MNCs, particularly those outside the group of foreign-owned formerly 
nationalised enterprises, were not very actively embedded with skills institutions. In other 
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words, the productive systems of MNCs were created at one remove from formal 
qualifications, and employment systems often at one remove from national and regional 
industrial relations actors, with a heavy reliance on firm-based systems. Thus, as previous 
research on employment relations in MNCs in Spain has found (e.g. Ferner et al 2001), the 
apparently densely institutionalised framework of Spanish employment is in fact very 
malleable as applied to MNEs; particularly among new entrants, regional or subsidiary-level 
compromises allowed for the creation of various forms of non-union HRM or of micro-level 
social partnership arrangements, both of which would be extremely difficult to establish in 
large Spanish-owned firms.  
While the qualifications and skills of the Spanish workforce within MNEs were not generally 
seen as problematic, managers dependent on relatively localised supply chains did have 
concerns with entrepreneurial and managerial capacity within the ‘industrial tissue’ of 
smaller enterprises which often had previously fairly captive markets in nationalised 
enterprises. This was also a concern of investment agencies, particularly in the more 
industrial economy of Asturias. This did lead the managers of some subsidiary units to 
engage in quality initiatives with indigenous firms, through open days, membership of quality 
clubs, etc., going beyond immediate market needs, on a fairly ad-hoc basis.  
Ireland 
Ireland, perhaps partly because of its size, has strongly centralised political administration, 
with 94 per cent of public expenditure decisions made at a national level (O’Broin and 
Walters 2007), and a fragmented sub-national infrastructure. While both the regions in which 
we carried out fieldwork have economic development agencies, their remit no longer includes 
FDI. What is most distinctive about Ireland, however, is the weight of FDI within the 
economy. This is driven by a long-held political consensus over an FDI-driven industrial 
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policy, with support for low corporation tax and liberalised trade policies extending 
throughout the political class. 
Thus, certainly compared to England, and despite fragmented sub-national government, 
Ireland has an articulated FDI-oriented business system. Thus the attraction and retention of 
FDI in Ireland operates via a hierarchy, with a predominantly national level orientation. The 
national inward investment agency has an extensive remit and is relatively powerful, being 
able to influence the relevant actions of national skills and other business system institutions 
to a much greater extent than in any of the other countries under investigation here. 
Below this national-level tier, higher education institutions and networks of supply chain 
firms operate as a secondary body of institutions central to the attraction and retention of FDI. 
The sub-national level substructure – local and regional government, the local offices of the 
national investment agency, regional development agencies – has some role in local 
networking and access to resources (Monaghan 2012), but with relatively little autonomy. 
The role of trade unions has declined over time, and is now very limited. 
Within this formal picture, Ireland is also marked by the distinctive importance of informal 
networking – both among MNCs, among institutions, and at the intersections between the 
two - at the sub-national level. Institutional action tends to coalesce in relation to FDI. 
Institutions tend to adopt a homogenous perspective on the role and importance of FDI to 
national and local economies, and thus systematically engage, both formally and informally, 
to encourage a positive environment for FDI. Institutional engagement with MNCs occurs 
both on a personal level and a formal institutional level, to enhance positive interactions and 
establish good relations within the sub national environment. Finally, there is evidence of 
MNCs engaging in positive, informal or semi-formal networking, namely collaboration on 
winning new mandates and investment, sharing best practice or on issues of common interest, 
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such as infrastructure within the sub national space. It appears there is a significant tendency 
for MNC subsidiaries in Ireland to interact with other Irish subsidiaries in order to enhance 
their position to corporate. Additionally, the informal relationships of local subsidiary 
managers within and between MNCs in the sub national location offer a significant 
contribution through the informal transfer of knowledge, access to unique resources and 
personal networking. This sort of activity within MNCs appears to go well beyond what is 
found elsewhere. 
This is partly an effect of the existing weight of FDI within the economy, and the 
concentration of managerial talent towards the foreign-owned sector. Interviewees repeatedly 
argued that, over time, Ireland had developed a cadre of managers who had become schooled 
in an MNE environment; they had developed skills and political acumen, not only on 
technical issues of management but also in developing and influencing corporate decision-
makers, attracting new mandates and generally embedding MNCs more deeply in Ireland. 
This is also affected by a particular form of overspill resulting from a pattern of former MNE 
managers setting up supply chain operations. 
In summary, in the formal sphere the national investment agency is of over-riding 
importance. This organisation in many ways reflects a national consensus on attracting and 
retaining FDI in Ireland. For all significant actors, whether specifically mandated to do so or 
otherwise, putting on the ‘green jersey’ and helping this effort is important: while issues of 
the intra-national distribution of investment are not absent, they are of secondary importance. 
This very strong consensus also somewhat overrides the ‘skills ecosystem’ role of some 
institutional actors, with solutions sought more by direct networking rather than navigating 




Canada is broadly a liberal market economy by any European standards. However, it is 
notably less ‘liberal’ within a North American context, with a larger welfare state and a 
somewhat more employee-friendly employment system. Outside the large natural resource 
sector, Canadian provinces compete for FDI on the basis of high quality general education 
and vocational training. Interviews also revealed that relatively open federal immigration 
policies were important in attracting FDI by increasing the possibilities of attracting highly 
educated and skilled workers; this was particularly the case in Ontario, which is in very direct 
competition for investment with the Northern United States. Overall though, the 
concentration of governance actors on development through foreign investment was perhaps 
somewhat more moderate than in the European economies examined here. In Quebec, in 
particular, the provincial state’s development strategies, while encouraging FDI, remained 
pre-occupied with the development of internationally competitive local firms. The provinces 
of Canada have, by any standards, an extremely high level of autonomy over most domestic 
affairs. Provincial governments are the key actors with regard to FDI governance policy, and 
also have substantial autonomy over issues related to employment and skills governance.  
The main locus of politics in Quebec is separatism vs. federalism. This is important for two 
reasons. First, provincial state attempts to reinforce a Quebecois national identity extend to 
the field of economic coordination. From the 1960s onwards, there has been a broad 
consensus about the role of the (provincial) state in economic development, and also the use 
of the state for the development of a Francophone business class.  Second, electorally, 
conventional conservative parties have been blocked from power. Quebec consequently has 
pursued a relatively social democratic interpretation of macro level neo-liberalism. Besides 
engaging in both initial investment, financing and aftercare in strategic sectors, the 
investment agency also manages a network of regional economic intervention funds, which 
entail a coalition of state, labour-sponsored, and cooperative investment funds engaged in 
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equity and quasi-equity financing for start-up, turn-around, succession and restructuring of 
companies as well as the creation of sector funds and regional development projects. Further, 
the provincial Ministry for economic development, innovation and exports, also engages 
extensively in aftercare, as well as having a strong tradition of economic intervention. 
Finally, particularly in energy-intensive sectors, access to preferential electricity tariffs 
(enabled by continued and largely uncontested provincial state ownership of the main 
electricity utility, as well as hydroelectric resources) can be made dependent on contributions 
to regional investment funds, as well as guarantees on levels of employment. While MNCs 
vary in their degree of voluntary engagement with economic coordination efforts, managers 
in most large subsidiary units have developed significant expertise in navigating the 
complexities of the institutional system in the hope of gaining advantages against rival plants 
elsewhere. 
Equally institutionalised relations between employers’ organisations and trade unions on 
matters such as skills are much denser in Quebec than in Ontario. Not only is trade union 
density substantially higher in Quebec than in the rest of Canada, but Quebec unions are more 
oriented towards economic development.  In general, Ontario pursues a more conventionally 
liberal approach, with fewer attempts at systematic coordination between civil society actors. 
There are fewer attempts at any systematic coordination, with initiatives such as cluster-
building taking place at more local levels, autonomously of provincial government. 
In general, the Canadian workforce is highly skilled, and both further education colleagues 
(“community colleges” in Ontario) and a successful higher education sector have high 
degrees of capacity to collaborate with business. This is a distinct competitive advantage, 
including for manual work, where the skills profile is recognised by, for example, auto 
manufacturers as being substantially higher than in the case of US states.  Having said this, 
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both the Canadian provinces are vulnerable to declining costs and protectionist impulses of 
the USA, and the very high levels of aid to inward investors available in some US states. 
Embedding the regime shoppers? 
Regions in all four countries mobilise around the attraction and retention of FDI, albeit to 
slightly different extents and with different emphases. In the two countries with important 
regional governments, there were differences in the degree of active coordination between 
more social democratic (Asturias, Quebec) and more liberal (Madrid, Ontario) approaches. 
But to what extent can any of these approaches hope to “embed” investment from regime 
shopping MNCs? 
Clearly, in considering this question, the structuring of regional business systems is only part 
of the story, and different MNCs are clearly non-identical here.  Drawing on early fieldwork 
in which the lead author participated, in all four countries, the framework in Figure 1 was 
developed.  
***INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE*** 
These include factors related to the MNC - the nature and specificity of skills and knowledge 
(Foss and Pedersen 2000), the nature of the value chain (Phelps and Fuller 2001), parent 
orientation (Morgan and Kristensen 2006) – as well as those related to the host national 
business system and degree (and nature) of sub-national business system autonomy. Our 
MNC interviews cover a range of companies which, in any given set of sub-national 
institutions, would be expected to have different levels of material interest in establishing 
active links, given their differences in terms of skills needs, value chain nature and degree of 
real mobility.  
Skills and knowledge  
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Multinationals vary considerably in their need to access geographically-specific combinations 
of skills and knowledge. It is important to examine the specific labour market of the 
particular MNC unit.  For most industrial MNC units, the labour market, except sometimes 
for senior managers, is primarily local/regional. If a manufacturing unit requires particular 
skills in its manual workforce, it is therefore relatively reliant on local/regional labour market 
institutions. This can mean that, in large industrial MNCs with, for example, plants in a 
variety of European countries, the different regions in which plants already exist compete for 
new investment through skills funding. This is very typically the case in the auto industry, for 
example. Labour market clusters can also be important. For example, one company we 
visited which is a subsidiary of a large French defence company is located in a small town in 
the North West of England because aerospace skills are strong there due to the historic 
importance of the formerly nationalised British Aerospace. This is in spite of the fact that its 
main customer is located in a different region. In this sort of case, there is strong potential for 
regional institutions to embed competitive advantage in global production networks through 
institution building in the skills area. As one Spanish trade union official told us, in 
attempting to explain Asturias’s relative success in attracting FDI, compared to most other 
peripheral Spanish regions, “an industrial working class is not created overnight”. Here, 
regional skills alliances, and/or sub-national-state-sponsored clustering-type initiatives such 
as those developed in Quebec, can be of importance. 
But it is important to remember that this is not always the case. Where skills are generic, 
regional institutions are less important. Even some very high skilled MNC units draw on a 
much wider labour market and are less reliant on the local labour market. For example, the 
pharmaceutical firm Astra Zeneca had until recently an R&D facility in the East Midlands, 
but had very few links with local or regional institutions as it drew upon a national and 
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international labour market for scientists. Its style of knowledge management meant that 
there was little overspill to the wider region.  
The value chain the crucial question here is ‘to what extent does the subsidiary unit need to 
bid for new investment, and can it improve its value chain position?’ Here, we saw an 
interesting contrast in between two large auto assembly plants, one owned by an American 
auto firm, the other by a Japanese firm. The subsidiary unit managers of the Japanese-owned 
plant know that, at least in the medium term, the parent firm’s relative lack of production 
capacity within the EU market means that all new models in a certain market segment will be 
manufactured at their plant, and they do not have to bid for new investment. In the American 
firm, however, each new model is the subject of a very competitive bidding process between 
a number of European plants, perhaps all of which are under threat of closure should the 
decision go the wrong way. So although the Japanese-owned plant is, at least in the medium-
term, more secure, the managers of the American plant engage much more intensively with 
regional and national skills actors, politicians and development agencies to ensure their 
competitive position. They also have made strong efforts to localise their supply chain, going 
somewhat against the centralising initiatives of the US HQ. For example, they encourage 
Chinese suppliers to the global firm to locate in their region, in order to gain competitive 
advantage versus their European subsidiary competitors. 
These examples show that the term ‘embeddedness’ has to be used carefully. Active 
engagement with institutional actors is not the same thing as security of long-term 
investment, and indeed, as in the US auto case, engagement may arise because of a lack of 
security, rather than the other way around. Also, many firms are, at least for the moment, 
firmly anchored in particular spaces in order to service markets, without necessarily having 
any great connections to regional governance actors.  
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Parent orientation  
All MNCs are not the same in terms of their ability to engage in high-trust, long-term 
relations with local firms and with governance actors; this is frequently related to the national 
business system of the parent company (Ferner 1997). While not a core basis of our 
comparison here, we have examples from both England and from Spain which might suggest 
that relative shareholder patience, and/or capacity to work within institutionally dense 
systems (in the case of some, though not all, German firms in Spain), sometimes remains a 
factor in both the capacity for subsidiary unit managers to deal autonomously with local 
institutions, and occasionally for parent-country managers to seek to use local institutional 
systems, particularly of industrial relations, to their own ends of social partnership etc. 
Host national business system Obviously, a focus on the sub-national should not mean 
neglect of the national host system, which, as seen, at the very least sets the framework 
within which the sub-national business system works, and in the cases of England and Ireland 
goes much further than this.  
As is well known, scholars of comparative capitalism in advanced economies often 
differentiate between countries in which non-market coordination of capitalism is 
commonplace, such as most of continental Europe, or, in somewhat different ways, Japan or 
Korea, and more liberal, and ‘liberal market economies’ such as most of the English speaking 
world. From our English results, we can confirm that getting companies to coordinate with 
each other on matters such as skills is extraordinarily difficult. While this is hardly an original 
observation, the extent to which this was true remained surprising to the English research 
team. For example, one regional development agency director encountered a situation where 
four large chemical firms in the same industrial park had the same skills deficits, which were 
potentially threatening future investment, but where unit managers had not talked to each 
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other about this. The regional development agency managed to coordinate a training 
programme, but this example illustrates how state intervention, which firms in liberal 
economies strongly distrust in general, is necessary for skills coordination in such economies. 
Specifically talking about the UK, employers’ associations are very weak because they are 
not required for collective bargaining purposes, and this can undermine skills initiatives. On a 
preliminary basis, skills do not seem to be anything like as much of an issue for MNC 
managers in Ireland: whether this is to do with better national coordination (Ireland has a 
history of national social actor collaboration), to the education and training system itself, or to 
more exogenous factors (such as a relatively young workforce and the high level of 
managerial competence and networking in a relatively ‘patriotic’ MNC sector, due to the 
critical importance of MNCs in the Irish economy), is a matter for further consideration. In 
the more formally regulated Spanish system, MNCs’ engagement with the official industrial 
relations system tends to be rather restrained, as mentioned above. Respondents in both 
Spanish regions saw labour market skills as generally good or unproblematic, reflecting a 
well-educated but under-employed workforce. Supply-side problems here are more in the 
areas of foreign languages and in managerial skills (cf. Gonzalez Menendez 2011) that 
around technical skills. 
Sub-national autonomy 
Finally, we argue that high levels of sub-national business system autonomy may create 
greater scope for institutional innovation. Looking at our four countries, in England regional 
autonomy is very weak. The previous Labour government created regional development 
agencies, which were important both in dealing directly with MNCs, and in wider economic 
governance, but these had very weak political legitimacy. The current government has 
abolished these, meaning there is now, in England, no serious political or economic 
governance between the local authority and national state levels. This, we believe, will create 
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serious difficulties of coordination, and is likely to exacerbate already strong economic 
differentials between the London area and the rest of the country. Ireland also has weak 
regional governance, but a strong national economic identity of managers, and a relatively 
high capacity for private networking, means private governance solutions can often be found 
on an ad-hoc basis. Spain has very highly autonomous, democratically-elected regional 
institutions, and in the case of Asturias, a regional social pact between employers, the region 
state and trade unions. This has the advantage that it is easier to mobilise local social and 
business actors around regional economic issues, and potentially that regional systems have a 
greater degree of coherence with specific region needs than in England, but the potential 
disadvantage that inter-regional competition means multinationals are able to “regime-shop” 
between regions. Finally, Canada’s federal system does seem to enable effective interactions 
at provincial level.  In Quebec, inter-firm and tripartite coordination on future skills was 
relatively well developed, at least in the industrial sector, with coordination being sponsored 
by the provincial state under a framework of active planning for competitiveness. As 
mentioned above, the existence of large state-controlled investment funds does give Quebec 
the possibility to ‘tailor’ incentives to individual MNCs while attempting to ensure that the 
provincial business system receives something in return. Southern Ontario, meanwhile, while 
not particularly ‘coordinated’ in a conventional sense, does seem to have developed means of 
ensuring micro-coordination between particular firms and vocational training institutions, 
certainly in comparison to the US Great Lakes regions with which it competes (also see 
Rutherford and Holmes 2011). 
Conclusions 
There is obvious room for debate about the possibilities and sustainability of relations 
between sub-national governance actors and MNCs. As Rutherford and Holmes (2011: 3) 
indicate, while some (e.g. Kristensen and Zeitlin 2005) “stress the synergies between TNCs 
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and regional institutions, others view this relationship as much more tenuous and 
contradictory and ultimately subject to power asymmetries favouring (MNCs)”. Equally, as 
host effects move from imperative regulation (i.e. constraints on firms) to the competitive 
provision of resources for potentially mobile investment, we see that, for such mobile firms, 
formal state regulation of labour markets is increasingly being over-ridden. This is not a 
simple case of deregulation, but rather of the supplementing, and sometimes challenging, of 
formal regulation with a complex, opaque network of governance actors, which may be 
public, para-public or private. Many such sources of governance are neglected within 
discussions of change in the employment relationship. 
Taking the need for economic spaces to compete for mobile investment as a given, the 
important question is that of ‘capture’: while most can see the potential for ‘overspill’ effects 
from foreign direct investment boosting local productivity and creating gains for the 
locality/region beyond the direct employment effects of FDI, these are not automatic and 
require governance. Equally, there are clear dangers, that given the asymmetric power 
relations between foreign investors and sub-national governance actors (Christopherson and 
Clark 2009), local institutions will, in attempting to maximise FDI, be ‘captured’ by MNCs. 
Given that our research concentrates on two specific regions in each country, it clearly does 
not exclude the possibility that other regions in those countries have developed specific 
strategies from those that are covered here. At the level of formal differences in policy, this is 
more likely in countries which are closer to a federal system of government than it is in 
countries where regional government is weak. Within this limitation, our cases show a number 
of different approaches to the sub-national governance of FDI.  In both the countries with 
strong sub-national government - Spain and Canada - there is an internal contrast between a 
relatively coordinated approach, with attempts at institution-building, and a much more free-
market approach. Ireland, which particularly post-crisis is hugely dependent on the foreign-
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owned export sector, has maintained a largely national, coordinated network approach to 
FDI. Finally, England has moved from an experiment in nationally-driven attempts to use 
regional governance to correct market failures, to a much more squarely neo-liberal approach.  
It is difficult to quantify which of these approaches is the most successful. This is particularly 
the case if we see the goal as optimising the local benefits to FDI, which is not necessarily the 
same thing as maximising the amount of FDI. However, one might tentatively conclude that 
those governance systems that have benefitted from a degree of political consensus that the 
process of FDI attraction and retention require substantive governance (Asturias, Ireland, 
Quebec) seem to have more chance of potentially creating positive outcomes than those 
where this is not the case. In particular, the institutional destruction in England, justified by 
the requirement for deficit-reduction, has occasioned substantial losses of institutional 
memory at sub-national levels, and has left a situation where directors of some large foreign 
MNCs lamenting institutional loss. Given current pressures at all levels of the state to cut 
costs, it is important not to lose sight of the need for what will remain high-cost host 
economies to create resources. This cannot happen in an institutional vacuum. 
Finally, social actors and policy makers have to be aware that any analysis of FDI, local 
embeddedness and potential contributions to local economies needs to take a very granular 
approach. That is, it needs to ask, on a unit by unit basis, why the firm is in a particular 
location, whether it is doing something there that is unique and/or is local resource 
dependent, whether there are sister plants elsewhere in the world, and what the real degree of 
potential mobility of the production/service provision of particular units is. This knowledge, 
which trade unions often have privileged access to, is a necessary pre-condition to 
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